This post merges two earlier frameworks, one for Social Security and one for universal health coverage, into a single plan with a single set of books. It is a proof of possibility, not finished statute. There are almost certainly errors in this post and the full framework - but it works within reasonable bounds. The full paper, with the year-by-year projection and every assumption, is available on request.
The premise
The United States runs two large social insurance systems, and both are failing on their own terms.
Social Security collected $1,449 billion in 2025 and paid out $1,609 billion. Its retirement trust fund is projected to run dry in 2032, after which incoming taxes cover 78 percent of scheduled benefits. Its cost is projected to rise from about 15 percent of taxable payroll to more than 20 percent. Even paid in full, the average benefit of roughly $2,000 a month is not an adequate retirement.
The 2032 date is not a forecast of what Congress might do. It is what current law already requires. Social Security can pay benefits only from its trust fund, so when the fund is empty the program pays out what comes in and nothing more. Benefits fall by about 22 percent automatically, for roughly 70 million people, with no vote taken. A retiree scheduled to receive $2,346 a month receives $1,830, a loss of about $6,200 a year. Congress does not have to act for the cut to happen. It has to act to prevent it.
Health care costs about $6 trillion a year. Roughly 27 million people are uninsured, and about $1.1 trillion of the total comes directly out of household budgets as premiums, deductibles, and bills.
The two systems tax the same wages, serve the same people at different ages, and fail on different schedules. Fixed separately, each has to close on its own. Fixed together, strength in one can cover weakness in the other. That is the case for one plan.
The plan in brief
- Health. Everyone with a Social Security number or taxpayer identification number is covered. No enrollment, no premiums at any age, copays capped at $500 a year.
- Retirement. Social Security converts, over one working lifetime, to individually owned and inheritable accounts. Current retirees and workers within ten years of retirement see no change.
- Financing. Existing payroll taxes continue. The payroll tax cap is removed. Employers pay a 14.6 percent health tax in place of the premiums they pay now. Retirement withdrawals carry a 5 percent levy. Large account balances carry a 25 percent levy at death.
- Borrowing. Transition bonds cover the gap while the old system is paid off.
- Lockbox. Plan revenue can go only to plan obligations, plan debt, or cutting plan taxes.
Health coverage
Coverage is automatic. Medicare needs enrollment today only because not everyone qualifies; when everyone qualifies, the first claim a provider submits is the enrollment. Primary care, preventive care, mental health, chronic medication, emergency care, maternity, and pediatrics cost nothing at the point of care. Discretionary use carries a modest flat copay, capped at $500 a year. The VA folds in as a provider network. Providers are paid at roughly today's overall level; the plan does not cut rates.
Employers stop buying insurance and pay a tax of 14.6 percent of wages instead, with no cap and no exemption by size. Because employer health costs vary so widely, the uniform rate phases in over four years. Each employer starts with an assessment based on 90 percent of what it spent per employee before the law, plus a uniform tax that begins at 7.5 percent and rises as the assessment falls away.
The cost of that design should be stated. The average employer goes from paying about 7.9 percent of wages for health coverage to 14.6 percent on the first day. The difference is what households were paying in premium shares and medical bills, which the plan moves onto employers. Workers' take-home pay rises at the same moment. Over time the two should offset through wages. In the first years they will not offset fully.
Rural hospitals are where single-payer plans usually fail, because cutting every hospital to Medicare rates closes the ones on thin margins. This plan does not cut rates. It pays a national blended rate, which is higher than what most rural hospitals collect today. It insures every patient who walks in, and it keeps cost-based payment for the smallest hospitals. Large urban systems that depend on commercial insurance receive less than they do now.
Retirement accounts
Workers under 55 keep the Social Security benefit they have already earned and build the rest in accounts they own.
| Account | Funded by | Access |
|---|---|---|
| Mandatory Private | 5 points of the existing 12.4% payroll tax | Locked until retirement |
| Mandatory 401(k) | Employee 3% rising to 10%, employer 3% | Early retirement or hardship only |
| Voluntary 401(k) | Voluntary | Never means-tested |
| Emergency | First contributions, up to $5,000 | Fully liquid |
| Birth Investment | $10,000 at birth for children in poverty, tapering to zero | Locked 65 years |
Investment rules loosen as the money becomes more the worker's own choice. The Mandatory Private Account, the Birth Investment, and the employer match hold low-cost index and lifecycle funds only. Employee contributions to the mandatory 401(k) get a wider fund menu with fees capped at 0.5 percent, but no individual stocks, leverage, or crypto. The voluntary 401(k) has broad freedom, including individual securities, with crypto limited to 10 percent of the balance.
Early access is allowed, and it cannot be gamed. The Mandatory Private Account is locked. The mandatory 401(k) can be tapped for early retirement or adjudicated hardship. Every early withdrawal is carried forward at the account's return to age 65, producing a phantom balance called the plus-up. The means test for the retirement floor counts the actual balance plus the plus-up. A worker who took out $50,000 at 45 is tested at 65 as though that money and its growth were still there. Workers keep access to their money, and no one qualifies for the floor by spending down.
The mandatory 401(k) is the one piece that takes new money from workers. It is their own money, but it reduces take-home pay by up to 10 percent, and the plan does not hide that.
What retirees receive
Income from the two mandatory accounts alone, at a 5.5 percent real return, after the withdrawal levy:
| Career wage | Social Security today | Payable after 2032 | Under the plan |
|---|---|---|---|
| $30,000 | $1,546 | $1,206 | $2,570 |
| $60,000 | $2,346 | $1,830 | $5,139 |
| $100,000 | $3,313 | $2,584 | $8,566 |
| $150,000 | $3,938 | $3,072 | $12,849 |
A worker earning $60,000 receives about $2,800 a month more than Social Security is scheduled to pay. Over a twenty-year retirement that is roughly $670,000, before counting the balance left in the account. At a lower return of 4.5 percent the same worker still receives about $4,000 a month.
Three qualifications belong next to that table.
The accounts are not guaranteed. The floor is. A retiree whose accounts produce less than 150 percent of the poverty line, about $2,000 a month, receives a supplement. That floor is roughly today's average benefit.
The comparison is not like for like. About 28 percent of each balance comes from existing payroll tax. The rest is new saving. The gain comes from saving more and investing it.
One group comes out slightly behind. Workers aged roughly 45 to 54 at enactment have too few years for the accounts to compound. A $60,000 earner in that group receives $2,160 to $2,315 a month against a scheduled $2,346, though well above the $1,830 current law can pay. A negotiated version of the plan would likely adjust this.
Inheritance
Social Security leaves almost nothing behind. A worker who dies at 66 after paying in for 43 years forfeits nearly all of it. Under the plan the balance belongs to the worker. Because withdrawals are assumed at 4 percent against a higher expected return, most retirees die with their principal largely intact. For the $60,000 worker, a spouse inherits $1.6 million untaxed, and heirs eventually receive about $1.47 million. Each generation starts with what the last one built.
The two levies
Withdrawals: 5 percent. Every retirement withdrawal carries a flat levy, withheld automatically. Legacy Social Security checks are exempt. The rate was chosen to match what the health plan gives back. A typical retiree stops paying about $375 a month in health costs: roughly $250 in Medicare premiums and supplemental policies, plus about $125 in coinsurance and deductibles after the plan's own copays.
| Monthly withdrawal | 5% levy | Health costs no longer paid | Net per month |
|---|---|---|---|
| $2,000 | $100 | $375 | Ahead $275 |
| $5,000 (median under the plan) | $250 | $375 | Ahead $125 |
| $7,500 | $375 | $375 | Even |
| $10,000 | $500 | $375 | Behind $125 |
A retiree who withdraws less than about $7,500 a month saves more on health costs than the levy takes.
At death: 25 percent above $1 million. This applies to the two mandatory accounts combined, with a spouse's inheritance deferred. Voluntary savings are exempt. The gap between 5 and 25 percent is deliberate. It nudges holders of large accounts to spend, give, or pass money into a descendant's locked account. Because the accounts are liquid and valued daily, the levy avoids the problems that estate taxes create for farms and family businesses.
A Birth Investment account returns in full if the holder dies before 25. It is public money that has not yet done its job.
The arithmetic
Every revenue source, at 2026 levels, in billions per year:
| Source | Rate | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| Social Security payroll tax | 12.4% to the cap | 1,383 |
| of which diverted to workers' accounts | 5 points | 445 rising to 558 |
| Cap removal | 12.4% above the cap | 251 |
| Medicare payroll tax | Existing | 429 |
| Employer health tax | 14.6% | 2,005 |
| Federal health spending already committed | Maintained | 1,684 |
| State Medicaid shares | Maintained | 352 |
| Tax on newly taxable wages | Existing rates | 146 |
| Withdrawal levy | 5% | 104 rising to 309 |
| Death levy | 25% above $1M | 0 until year 25, then to 150 |
The health tax is sized to a conservative estimate of savings: about $490 billion a year, with nothing assumed from fraud reduction. An optimistic estimate is more than twice that. If savings come in higher, the excess goes to the bonds.
The 14.6 percent replaces what the private sector pays now. Households and employers together spend about $2,140 billion a year on premiums and out-of-pocket costs for covered care. Under the plan they pay about $2,150 billion in health tax and added tax on wages. The total is the same. Everyone is covered and nobody faces a deductible.
The sixty-year projection
Diverting payroll tax into private accounts while still paying earned benefits opens a gap that peaks near $780 billion a year and closes in year 39. Transition bonds cover it.
| Conservative | Midway | Optimistic | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peak debt | $16.7T | $4.7T | None beyond existing reserves |
| New borrowing ends | Year 37 | Year 27 | Year 6 |
| Bonds retired | Year 62 | Year 40 | Not needed |
| Health tax after payoff | 6.1% | 3.5% | 1.0% |
In the conservative case, peak debt is about half of one year's national output. That is very large, and two things put it in context. Paying scheduled Social Security benefits under current law falls $32.8 trillion short over the same sixty years and is still losing about $805 billion a year at the end. The plan borrows less, and its borrowing stops. And by the time the debt peaks, workers hold several times that amount in accounts they own.
How the two halves support each other
- Health savings arrive when Social Security needs them. The retirement transition borrows most in years 5 to 25. Health savings above the conservative case are the only money available in that window. In the midway case they cut peak debt from $16.7 trillion to $4.7 trillion.
- Retirement surpluses later pay for health. Once earned benefits are paid out, the remaining payroll tax runs a surplus of about $740 billion a year and the levies raise about $460 billion. That is what lets the health tax fall by more than half.
- Health relief helps fund the savings mandate. A worker with no premiums or deductibles has more room to save.
- One administrative spine. One identifier, one account opened at birth that is also health enrollment, one bond program, one trust.
Who pays and who gains
A worker's health cost today is the whole premium, including the employer's share, plus out-of-pocket spending.
| Household | Health cost today | Under the plan | After payoff |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single worker, $60,000 | $11,050 | $9,240 | $4,140 |
| Family, one earner, $85,000 | $32,100 | $14,310 | $7,085 |
| Family, two earners, $150,000 | $32,100 | $24,500 | $11,750 |
| Single worker, $85,000 | $11,050 | $12,890 | $5,665 |
| Single worker, $250,000 | $11,050 | $37,175 | $15,925 |
A single worker comes out ahead below about $72,000 and a family below about $207,000. Single workers above that line pay somewhat more until the rate falls, and high earners pay substantially more.
The health comparison is the smaller part of the picture. The $85,000 single worker who pays about $1,840 a year more for health retires on roughly $7,300 a month against a scheduled $3,000. For nearly every household, the added retirement income and the inheritable balance are worth many times what the plan's taxes cost. Most of that gain is the worker's own required saving, so it is not a transfer from anyone else.
There are also benefits the ledger does not count: no medical bankruptcy, no medical debt collection or seizure of tax refunds for hospital bills, no losing coverage with a job, no benefit cliffs that punish a raise, and lower auto and workers' compensation costs.
The lockbox
Plan revenue is applied in a fixed order: current obligations, bond interest, bond principal, a capped reserve once the bonds are retired, and then automatic cuts to plan tax rates. Nothing outside the plan may be funded from it. The bonds are a distinct instrument, protected once issued by the Fourteenth Amendment's public debt clause, and bondholders can sue if the money is diverted. No statute binds a future Congress. These provisions raise the price of breaking the rule; they cannot forbid it.
The costs, named
- Health cost growth. The projection assumes covered health spending grows no faster than wages. If it outruns wages by half a point a year for twenty years, the conservative case does not pay off. A statutory growth cap is part of the plan for that reason.
- Immigration. The projection uses the Social Security Trustees' assumption of about 1.18 million net immigrants a year. That is close to the target in the immigration framework and far above current policy.
- Interest rates and returns. Higher borrowing costs push the payoff later. Lower investment returns raise the cost of the floor.
- Most health-sector profit survives. Insurer profit ends. Hospital, physician, and supplier margins are untouched. The plan keeps paying the premium that funds medical innovation. That is a choice.
- Who carries the debt. In the conservative case a child born at enactment pays the full rate for most of a working life. That generation receives the accounts and the coverage. The lower tax rate arrives for their children.
What it does not solve
Dental, vision, hearing, and custodial long-term care are not in the base plan. They are written as a rider that takes effect only if the plan runs ahead of its conservative projection, and Congress can fund either sooner by paying for it. The plan also covers people who pay in using taxpayer identification numbers, and it says plainly that this is not immigration reform.
Borrowing for them
Federal borrowing today pays for current consumption and leaves the bill to people who had no say. This plan borrows too, and the amount is large. The difference is what the money buys: an account in every child's name at birth, health coverage that cannot be lost, and a retirement they own. It replaces a promise that current law already cannot keep. The borrowing ends, the bonds are repaid, and the tax rate then falls.
The plan is certainly missing things, and parts of it can be done better. It was built with AI assistance by a tax practitioner, not an actuarial office, and it is meant to be taken apart by people who know more. It will work if it is refined honestly by experts. It will fail if each provision is renegotiated by whoever profits from the current arrangement.
One more thing. Between the first draft of this framework and this version, the official projections for both Social Security and health spending got worse, and every number in the plan got worse with them. That continues for as long as nothing is done.
The arithmetic is the argument. If it is wrong, I would like to know where.
Sources: Social Security Administration, 2026 OASDI Trustees Report and Office of the Chief Actuary solvency estimates; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Accounts and projections. Savings, scope, levy, and household figures are the author's estimates and should be replaced by official scoring.

